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Abstract: 
Equity asset managers within professional investment advisory firms will often manage 
both discretionary fee-based accounts as well as open-ended mutual funds - using 
comparable domestic equity investment disciplines. When retail and institutional 
investors choose between these products, their decision often hinges on performance and 
portfolio customization. After reconciling each product’s gross performance for 
calculation methodology, management and trading costs, and systematic risk measures, 
we find that concurrently-managed (where the same personnel manage a separately 
managed account and an open-ended mutual fund over the same time period using 
identical investment disciplines) small-cap separately managed accounts outperform 
small-cap actively-managed open-ended mutual funds between 1998 and 2003. We argue 
that this difference in performance is attributable to differences in asset growth as well as 
an advisory firm’s reluctance to accept smaller separately managed accounts. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Retail and institutional investors often employ investment advisory firms to actively 
manage their portfolios.  For example, as of the fourth quarter of 2005, $9.13 trillion1 
were invested in actively managed portfolios.  Furthermore, over the period from 2000 to 
2005, assets under management have increased 34 percent (from $6.79 trillion to $9.13 
trillion).  Even on a relative basis, actively managed portfolios continue to dominate the 
investment landscape.   
 One interesting aspect of the growth in assets under management is the popularity 
of separately-managed accounts (SMAs) that provide investors with custom portfolio 
management strategies.  Customized portfolio strategies through SMAs can take many 
forms, ranging from the asset manager having complete discretion over all investments to 
instructions limiting the sale of specific stocks.  However, customized portfolio 
management is costly and thus, brokerage firms traditionally maintained minimum 
account sizes of $1 million to $5 million in order to have access to SMAs.  Yet 
competition in the investment advisory industry and technological advances in 
information management have resulted in a dramatic decline in SMA fees and minimum 
asset sizes.  For example, brokerage firms now offer SMA services to investors with as 
little as $100,000 while average SMA fees have declined from 2.03 percent in 2000 to 
1.65 percent in 2005.2
 However, growth in SMA popularity resulting from the decline in minimum 
account sizes, management costs, and trading fees, has also had an adverse effect on the 
investment advisory firms’ ability (or willingness) to customize portfolios to investor 
                                                 
1 Sum of open-ended, closed-end, and exchange-traded funds as well as separately managed accounts. 
2 Cerulli Associates 
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specific objectives.  For example, in exchange for an advisory firm’s willingness to 
manage SMA portfolios with minimum account sizes as low as $50,000, investors are 
often restricted to “target allocations” that are consistent across all portfolios under the 
firm’s management.  
The growth in the popularity of SMA accounts and the technological changes that 
allow an advisory firm to manage smaller account sizes motivate the two research 
questions addressed in this paper: (1) Do SMAs that are concurrently managed by the 
same person(s) offer higher returns than traditional actively managed mutual funds? and 
(2) Are differences in SMA and mutual fund performance related to an advisory firm’s 
ability to offer customized SMA  portfolio management?  
To answer these questions we analyze returns of domestic equity SMAs and 
mutual funds (MFs).  In addition, we focus on a subset of SMAs and MFs that are 
concurrently-managed within the same advisory firm.  By examining the performance of 
concurrently managed accounts, we directly test whether SMAs outperform MFs, holding 
the effects of the asset manager constant.  Our initial findings suggest that the returns 
from large and small-cap SMAs are significantly higher than the returns from MFs, and 
this difference is significantly stronger when comparing institutional-oriented SMAs and 
MFs.   
 In the following section, we briefly survey the development of the separately 
managed account and discuss the differences between SMAs and MFs.  Section 3 
describes the data and empirical methods.  Section 4 presents the results from our 
analysis and Section 5 concludes. 
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2 Differences Between Managed Accounts and Open-Ended Mutual Funds 
Institutional and retail brokerage investors who desire fee-based professional asset 
management may purchase shares in open-ended, actively managed mutual funds or 
contractually employ an independent investment advisory firm to manage a discretionary 
portfolio on their behalf.  Although some confusion exists in the investment consulting 
industry as to what actually constitutes a managed account, the industry generally 
classifies accounts into five program types with the primary differences being who 
actually manages the portfolio and the types of investment products held within the 
portfolio.  For example, Consultant Separately Managed Account Programs (the 
traditional SMA) include all discretionary portfolios that are managed by unaffiliated 
investment advisors for investors whose assets are held in custody at a broker/dealer.  
Minimum account sizes can be as low as $50,000 (in a WRAP program), and all-
inclusive WRAP fees often range between 1.5% and 2.5%, depending on account size. 
The SMA typically has two different cost structures. First, an investor can have a 
fee-plus-commission arrangement where the asset manager collects a percentage of assets 
under management (usually paid quarterly) and the broker/dealer receives a per-trade 
commission. Alternatively, under an all-inclusive “WRAP” fee arrangement, the investor 
pays for both asset management and broker/dealer fees at once. The WRAP fee 
arrangement is most commonly used with retail-oriented brokerage accounts, and the fee-
plus-commission arrangement is primarily used with relatively larger institutional SMAs 
(minimum portfolio size of $5 to $10 million). 
E.F. Hutton alleges that it first offered SMAs to institutional clients in the 1970s – 
initially offering such a product to retail clients in 1974. However, due to the higher 
 4
transaction costs associated with these accounts, fee-based individually managed 
accounts were only accessible to institutions, pension plans, and high net-worth 
individuals in the 1970s and 1980s. During the late 1970s and 1980s, competition among 
broker/dealers resulted in the introduction of SMA programs that commonly charged a 
set fee plus commission or a WRAP fee. Fee arrangements varied due to differences in 
account sizes, allowing for portfolio value “breakpoints” that would reduce management 
and brokerage fees. During this period, minimum account sizes were rarely less than $1 
million given the time and bookkeeping costs necessary to trade and administer client 
accounts. 
The development of new technology and trading software in the early and mid-
1990s allowed professional asset managers to individually manage fee-based portfolios in 
a fraction of the time and at significantly reduced costs. For example, the development of 
specialized software now allows brokerage firms to disseminate a large trade among 
hundreds of accounts with no manual bookkeeping. As a result of these cost savings, 
SMA minimum account sizes have declined to the $50,000 level  with all-inclusive fees 
of approximately 2% of assets under management.  Today, the industry’s five market 
leading firms, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, UBS PaineWebber, 
Prudential, and Salomon Smith Barney, collectively custody approximately 70% of assets 
held in SMAs. 
In classifying mutual fund accounts, James and Karceski (2002) suggest that 
open-ended MFs fall into three categories: (1) “large institutional” funds with a minimum 
initial investment of at least $500,000, (2) “small institutional” funds with a minimum 
initial investment between $100,000 and $500,000, and (3) retail funds with minimums 
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below $100,000. James and Karceski (2002) find that large institutional funds commonly 
exist for pension funds, endowments, foundations, and high net-worth individuals, 
whereas small institutional funds typically solicit clients within bank trust departments, 
insurance companies, and fee-based financial advisors.  However, the primary difference 
between managed accounts and mutual funds is that MFs cannot offer customized tax 
selling to enhance losses and possibly offset gains, specialized stock screening to meet an 
account’s social, ethical, or economic preferences, or control of timing and direction of 
the inflows and outflows of specific assets from an account. 
One of the more obvious differences in MFs and SMAs is that a traditional open-
ended MF offers shareholders a percentage ownership or stake in a co-mingled pooled 
account, whereas a SMA provides ownership of securities that are in custody at a broker-
dealer. As a result, the MF is commonly perceived to be more restrictive given that 
investors cannot specifically request particular trading guidelines. Conversely, SMAs 
offer investors greater control over account management, particularly the ability to 
restrict the manager’s trading activity.  The ability to set trading parameters can be 
important for investors who are sensitive to incurring realized capital gains and losses.  
Although MF managers may adhere to a tax-sensitive trading discipline in terms of 
incurring realized capital gains, they cannot meet specific capital gain restrictions for 
individual shareholders. Furthermore, new shareholders can inherit embedded capital 
gains that were realized prior to purchase.3  In contrast, most SMAs claim to offer asset 
management guidelines that include client-specific tax planning strategies. For example, 
if a client wishes to withhold a particular security from sale, the SMA asset manager can 
                                                 
3 For example, assuming a fund pays its capital gains distributions to its shareholders in November, a new 
shareholder who purchases the fund in October (prior to its ex-dividend date) will fully participate in such a 
distribution. 
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“set aside” that position. In addition, given that SMAs operationally function as retail 
brokerage accounts, an asset manager can attempt to harvest a specific amount of capital 
gains/losses at any time. Such customization, however, is costly. Restrictions on the 
realization of capital gains and losses can potentially compromise the SMA asset 
manager’s investment strategy and discipline. Thus, some asset managers refrain from 
accepting accounts with client-specific constraints.  
Differences also exist in how investors access MFs and SMAs. Retail MFs 
typically have account minimum sizes ranging between $500 and $10,000, with some 
funds having minimums as low as $50 for clients agreeing to systematic monthly 
automatic withdrawals. Institutional MF minimum account sizes typically range between 
$25,000 and $500,000, depending on client characteristics and/or a fund’s client referral 
source.4  Conversely, SMA minimums are usually $50,000 for broker-sponsored WRAP 
fee accounts, and upwards of $5 million for institutional fee-plus-commission 
arrangements. The lower SMA minimum account size ($50,000) is typically reserved for 
consultant programs in which an external investment advisory firm has a contractual 
arrangement with a broker-dealer. Under these arrangements a broker/dealer agrees to 
promote an advisory firm (as being included in its managed account program) in 
exchange for low account size minimums and/or favorable management fees for its 
clients. In order to manage the hundreds or thousands of accounts under the broker/dealer 
WRAP program, most broker/dealers provide an automated trading platform that enables 
advisory firms to create block trades and disseminate allocations to individual accounts 
                                                 
4 James and Karceski (2002) suggest that fund minimums are related to whether concentration of a fund’s 
shareholders are referred by a specific type of institution, such as a bank trust department. 
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without tedious bookkeeping or non-productive time on the phone with various trading 
desks. 
The last important difference between MFs and SMAs is the number of positions 
usually held.  A typical equity MF will hold in excess of 75 different common or 
preferred stocks, whereas a typical SMA will hold between 40 and 60 positions. Even 
MFs that are concurrently managed with SMA accounts will commonly hold two to three 
times as many positions as their SMA counterpart, diversifying among and within more 
sectors and industry groups. SMA clients may even specifically prohibit industry or 
individual asset concentrations. For example, an investment policy statement can prohibit 
investment advisory firms from portfolio concentrations greater than 20% among 
industries and 5% among individual assets. In contrast, a MF is limited in its ability to 
concentrate funds in a particular security.  The Investment Company Act of 1940 
prohibits MFs from allocating more than 5% of a fund’s market value to an individual 
security. 
Portfolio customization and investor characteristics aside, prior research suggests 
that actively managed SMAs can achieve superior performance over co-mingled, open-
ended MFs. For example, Padgette (1998) finds that large-cap, domestic equity SMA 
portfolios outperformed similar open-ended retail MF’s from 1988 to 1997.  However, 
Padgette (1988) only compares gross returns and thus his analysis does not control for the 
higher fees (trading, management, and administrative costs) charged to SMA investors. In 
this study, we compare net SMA returns to net MF returns – adjusting for management 
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and trading costs.5 In addition, we test for differences in both large-cap and small-cap 
products.  
 James and Karceski (2003) suggest that a client’s account size may influence a 
fund manager’s portfolio management decisions within particular classes of open-ended 
mutual funds. For example, samples of institutional funds with minimum initial 
investments of $500,000 significantly outperform institutional funds with minimum 
initial investments of $100,000 as well as retail funds with minimums under $100,000. 
They find that these differences cannot be fully explained by variations in internal 
expenses. In addition, Del Guercio and Tkac (2001) find a disparity in sophistication and 
monitoring efforts among different classes of retail and institutional investors. As a result, 
they argue that a difference in an investor’s account size is associated with differences in 
how a portfolio’s fund flows relate to performance.  Similar to James and Karceski 
(2003), we categorize accounts into small retail (accounts having less than $500,000 
under management), large-retail (accounts with minimum account sizes between 
$500,000 and $5,000,000), and institutional (accounts with at least $5,000,000 under 
management.) 
 We also consider whether actively managed portfolios (SMAs or MFs) offer risk-
adjusted abnormal returns. If an advisor’s management of a portfolio adds value beyond 
the performance of a passively managed market portfolio, she will generate positive risk-
adjusted abnormal performance. SMA and MF risk-adjusted abnormal returns are the 
intercepts estimated from the following model: 
                                                 
5 We adjust SMA and MF returns for management, administrative, and trading costs, but not front or back-
end loads.  We do not adjust for sales loads for two reasons: (1) many open-ended mutual funds do not 
carry loads, and (2) funds that do carry loads usually offer reductions in loads with larger accounts, whereas 
a shareholder can reduce his load by “hitting breakpoints” that reduce the front or back-end load in 
exchange for a promise to place a minimum dollar amount under the fund’s management. 
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where ERETURN is the quarterly return of an SMA or a MF in excess of the risk-free 
rate. RMRF is the excess return of the CRSP value-weighted market index. SMB, HML, 
and PR1YR are obtained from Ken French and Mark Carhart, and represent factor-
mimicking portfolio returns adjusted for size, book-to-market, and momentum, 
respectively (see Fama and French, 1993 and Carhart, 1997.) 
 Advances in technology in the early-to-mid 1990’s enabled advisory firms to 
concurrently manage SMA portfolios and MFs without losing efficiencies associated with 
trading and asset allocation. By comparing each product within an advisory firm, we can 
target portfolio and firm characteristics that can help explain potential disparities in 
performance. Accordingly, we also compare the performance of concurrently managed 
SMAs and MFs that employ the same personnel and investment objectives.  
 Furthermore, we also consider whether firm characteristics pertaining to asset 
growth, reputation, and the decision to accept smaller SMA account sizes can explain 
performance differences.  SMAs differ from MFs in their availability to offer portfolio 
customization. Advisory firms that concentrate on managing relatively larger SMA 
portfolios (minimum account sizes in excess of $500,000) are considered to offer greater 
customization. Conversely, advisory firms that participate in broker-dealer sub-advisory 
programs, and in exchange are forced to accept account sizes as low as $50,000, are less 
likely to tailor individual portfolios to a client’s specific investment objectives. 
With regard to reputation, industry experts agree that reputable firms are more 
transparent and thus better known and scrutinized among institutional and retail investors. 
As a result, experts argue that investor monitoring motivates advisory firms to 
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concurrently manage their SMAs and MFs in a more similar fashion. We use total assets 
under management, age, percentage growth in size, average MORNINGSTAR rating 
among its mutual funds, percentage growth in “Endowment” or “Foundation” accounts, 
as well as whether it manages retail SMA portfolios as a “sub-advisor” within a broker-
dealer program, as measures of firm reputation. 
 
3. Data and Empirical Methodology 
We collected quarterly returns for a sample of SMA accounts and open-ended mutual 
funds for the period from 1998 to 2005. Our data sources are Prima Capital for SMA 
returns, the Center for Research and Securities Prices for MF returns, and Morningstar 
for other MF data. We require that each MF and SMA follow industry reporting 
standards in order to minimize differences in return calculation methodology, 
management style categorization, and the treatment of management and brokerage fees. 
In order to compare SMA returns to MF returns, we made three adjustments to the 
individual returns. First, we adjust SMA returns to reconcile a discrepancy between SMA 
and MF return calculation methodology. Second, we reconcile differences in how SMAs 
and MFs define their investment objectives. Third, we reconcile differences in how 
returns may or may not include specific management or brokerage costs.  
SMA returns include quarterly changes in the market values of portfolios within a 
single SMA product of an investment advisory firm. In calculating returns, advisory firms 
use their own return calculation method or the return calculation methodology sanctioned 
by the Association of Investment Management and Research’s (AIMR) Performance 
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Presentation Standards (PPS). 6 To minimize inconsistencies and biases related to 
differences in SMA return calculation methods, we only include SMAs accounts that 
adhere to AIMR PPS and thus best match standard MF returns calculation methods.  
MFs use a standardized calculation method to capture the change in Net Asset 
Value (NAV) from one period to the next. Quarterly MF returns are calculated from the 
average change in NAV using the following CRSP calculation: 
1)]_/_()][_/_1()[/(
11
1,1 −+= ∏∏
==
−−
S
k
K
k
S
k
D
j
J
j
D
jtttt NAVREAMTXNAVREAMTXNAVNAVR
(2) 
where the NAVt is the fund’s net asset value per unit at t, j is the number of dividend or 
capital gains distributions during the period t-1 to t, k is the number of NAV splits during 
the period t-1 to t,  is the jDjAMTX _
th dividend or capital gains distribution during the 
period t-1 to t,  is the NAV at which jth dividend or capital gains distribution 
was reinvested,  is the number of new shares per the number of old shares 
investors received in the kth NAV split over the period, and  is the number of 
old shares investors traded in for new shares in the kth NAV split.   
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In contrast, SMA returns must accommodate cash flows within specific portfolios. 
Since SMA accounts are conglomerations of individually managed portfolios, calculating 
their time period returns present two challenges: (1) accounts must be asset-weighted, 
where portfolio weightings should reflect market values as well as in-period cash flows 
and (2) accounts must accommodate time-weighted cash flows, where sub-period returns 
are computed between cash flows and then geometrically linked.7  
                                                 
6 See Appendix A1 for references to AIMR PPS 
7 AIMR Guidance Statement of Calculation Methodology 
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To meet these challenges, AIMR Performance Presentation Standards suggest a 
process for calculating a time-weighted composite return. First, each portfolio must 
accommodate an investor’s cash withdrawals and contributions by computing a 
weighting factor for each cash flow. For example, the following computation is used to 
time-weight an individual portfolio’s cash flows: 
( )
CD
DCD
W jiji
,
,
−=        (3) 
whereCD is the total number of calendar days in the period and is the number of 
calendar days since the beginning of the period in which cash flow occurred in portfolio 
. Second, the composite’s period return, , is calculated by capturing the cash 
flow-weighted change in the account’s beginning market value using the following: 
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where  is the cash flow within the period for portfolio (contributions to the 
portfolio are positive flows, and withdrawals or distributions are negative flows) and is 
the return for portfolio .  represents the change in a portfolio’s market value (EMV – 
BMV) divided by its original value (BMV). 
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If an advisory firm adheres to the AIMR calculation standards, its individual 
portfolio cash flows will have an effect on distorting composite SMA performance. 
Therefore, in order to create a like SMA-MF comparison, we only compare MF returns to 
SMA returns that are in AIMR compliance. 
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 A second inconsistency across the SMA and MF accounts is the difference in the 
definition of a product’s style or management objective. Advisory firms follow a variety 
of self-prescribed equity investment disciplines. While Morningstar is universally known 
to categorize many MFs, the investment management objectives of most SMAs follow no 
standardized categorization. Thus, we match SMA and MF style descriptions by pairing 
benchmarks that are self-prescribed by an advisory firm. As a result, our sample only 
includes domestic equity SMA composites and MFs that are benchmarked to an identical 
list of self-proclaimed indexes.8  
 SMAs and MFs also have different mechanisms for how investors pay for broker-
dealer services and advisory firm asset management. The open-ended MF has an internal 
management fee (paid quarterly as a percentage of the fund’s market value), trading 
commissions, and a selling commission (paid at the time of purchase and/or sale for 
“loaded” funds). Selling commissions only apply to “loaded” funds sold by third parties 
(banks, brokerages, etc.), but are tiered in size based on an investor’s purchase amount. 
Therefore, larger retail and institutional MFs (loaded) offer reduced or no selling 
commissions when an investor’s purchase amount reaches “break points”.   
Conversely, an SMA typically offers investor’s the opportunity to pay for all 
broker-dealer and asset management costs with one fee. An all-inclusive “WRAP” fee 
arrangement or a “fee plus commission” arrangement allows a client to pay a fixed 
percentage of assets under an advisor’s management each quarter. 
                                                 
8 We categorize MFs and SMAs as Large Cap funds if they track one of the following indices:  Russell 
1000, Russell 1000 Growth, Russell 1000 Value, S&P 500, S&P 500 Barra Growth, S&P 500 Barra Value, 
Wilshire Target Top 750, Wilshire Target Large Company Growth, Wilshire Target Large Company Value.  
We categorize MFs and SMAs as Small Cap funds if they track one of the following indices: Russell 2000, 
Russell 2000 Growth, Russell 2000 Value, S&P Small Cap Barra 600, S&P Small Cap 600 Growth, S&P 
600 Small Cap Barra Value, Wilshire Target Small Company Growth, Wilshire Target Small Company 
Value. 
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To reconcile differences between MF multiple fees (internal, commissions, and 
loads) with SMA all inclusive fee structure, we compare SMA returns that are net of 
management and trading costs to MF returns that are net of management and trading 
costs, but not selling commissions. Three observations motivate the decision to exclude 
selling commissions from MF returns: (1) many MFs in our samples are no-load and thus 
do not carry a selling commission; (2) most loaded MFs in our samples are offered 
through broker-dealer “fee-only” programs that enable investors to purchase them at 
NAV (no load), while paying a separate fee based on assets under management; and (3) 
most loaded MFs offer reduced loads when a shareholder invests a certain amount within 
the MF’s fund family. As a result, loaded MFs usually offer a variety of selling 
commission arrangements that are based on criteria specific to investor characteristics. 
Finally, we exclude from the analysis all funds having names that indicate 
concentrations in convertible securities, REIT’s, or sector funds. In addition, we also 
exclude all SMAs or MFs that follow a passive index management style, hold a majority 
concentration in international securities, or include “all-cap” or “mid-cap” in their 
names.9
 
4. Empirical Results 
SMA Fee Adjustments 
Prior to comparing SMA and MF returns, we adjust SMA returns for management 
and trading costs.  Unfortunately, SMA managers do not report management and trading 
cost information.  Thus, we adjust the SMA returns using the average the management 
fee prevailing in the market based on a survey of five representative broker-dealers.  We 
                                                 
9 Parameters used in the Ennis and Sebastian (2002) and Del Guercio and Tkac (2001) studies. 
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assume that competition for assets from sophisticated SMA investors ensures that SMA 
management fees are roughly consistent with these estimates.10  Table 3 displays the 
midpoint, minimum, and maximum SMA management fees based on assets under 
management and shows a positive relationship between WRAP fee and account size.  For 
example, the average WRAP fee on the smallest accounts is 2.4% of assets under 
management while the largest accounts (those with assets greater than $5 million) have 
average WRAP fees of 1.1%.  Furthermore, we note that the range between the maximum 
and minimum WRAP fee declines as account size increases, indicating that competition 
among broker-dealers is the most intense for large accounts. 
 We adjust SMA returns for the average annual WRAP fee as follows: 
it
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where is the net-of-fee quarterly SMA return for fund i at quarter t, is the average 
annual SMA WRAP fee corresponding to the minimum account size m for fund i, and 
is the gross-of-fee quarterly SMA return for fund i at quarter t.  All analysis is 
conducted using SMA net of fee returns.
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Comparing Performance across Concurrently-Managed SMA and MF Samples 
 Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the 115 concurrently-managed SMA 
and MF products.  We compare SMA and MF return performance and portfolio 
                                                 
10 We conducted separate analysis using the midpoint, minimum, and maximum fee and found that the 
results are not materially different. 
11 The MF sample returns do not include applicable selling commissions. Selling commissions only apply 
to “loaded” funds sold by third parties and are tiered in size based on the size of investment. Therefore, we 
are unaware of the return impact of selling commissions, but do know that their neglect possibly overstates 
the results. 
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characteristics, including portfolio turnover, average number of positions, assets under 
management, minimum initial investment, and average annual 6-year net inflow.12 
Turnover and the average number of positions are directly controlled by the investment 
advisor who has discretion over the management and allocation of the fund’s portfolio. 
The decision of where to set an SMA or MF’s minimum initial investment is directed by 
the fund’s advisory firm, whereas a fund’s assets under management and annual net 
inflow are market-driven variables that capture investor sentiment. 
Table 1 shows that the mean returns for small-cap SMAs are significantly larger 
(at a 1% level) than the mean returns on the corresponding MFs. Small-cap SMAs 
outperformed small-cap MFs by an average of 28 basis points. In comparing the mean 
portfolio turnover and number of position it appears that SMA managers trade less 
aggressively than MF managers, where aggressive trading activity corresponds to holding 
more positions and having higher portfolio turnover rates. For example, large-cap mutual 
fund managers have a 9.72% less annual turnover rate, while both large-cap and small-
cap MFs hold approximately 13 more positions. 
 On average, the assets under management within an advisory firm’s SMA 
portfolios are significantly larger than the assets under management within a firm’s MFs. 
Relative to MFs, we find that SMAs hold more assets. These results are consistent with 
the average minimum initial investment of an SMA, given that SMAs rarely offer 
minimums less than $100,000 and many MFs offer minimums in the $500 to $2,000 
range. 
                                                 
12 The portfolio turnover, number of positions and assets under management reflect year 2003 only.  These 
characteristics are unavailable for earlier years. 
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 Finally, we find that average annual net inflow is also significantly different 
across large-cap SMAs and MFs. Large-cap SMAs annually attract a greater (significant 
at a 5% level) percentage of new capital, in excess of capital outflow, than MFs. 
However, we find little evidence that stronger net capital inflows exist among small-cap 
investors.  
 
Evaluating Risk-Adjusted Performance 
 We specifically compare each individual firm’s concurrently-managed SMA and 
MF products to determine whether a significant difference in risk-adjusted returns exists. 
Based on the results in Table 2, we find that only two of the large-cap firms offer 
significantly different (at a 5% level or better) conditional abnormal returns; one firm 
with stronger SMA returns and the other with stronger MF returns. The small-cap sample 
reveals seven firms with significant abnormal performance (at a 5% level or better) and 
one firm with a difference significant at a 10% level. In addition, we find that each of 
these differences in small-cap return sets favors the SMA product. In aggregate, the 
Table 2 results illustrate that only 9 of 115 firms (8%) have any significant risk-adjusted 
return difference in their concurrently-managed SMA and MF accounts.  
 We also test for relationships between differences in concurrently-managed fund 
performance and exogenous and endogenous variables. Based on information gathered 
from industry experts, prior literature, and our earlier results, we expect that an advisor’s 
decision to target investor clienteles (categorized by minimum account size), the inflow 
of new capital, and an advisory firm’s reputation may explain the existence of any 
difference in abnormal returns. 
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 To capture an advisory firm’s exogenous relationships, we develop six variables 
that are designed to control for firm reputation: (1) the annual average percentage growth 
in size for all SMAs managed by an investment management firm, (2) the average annual 
percentage growth in size for all SMAs managed by an investment management firm that 
are categorized as either an “Endowment” or “Foundation”, (3) the average 5-year 
Morningstar rating for all mutual funds managed by an investment management firm, (4) 
the total number of years an investment management firm has been in existence (as of 
2003), (5) a binary variable that captures whether an advisory firm’s SMA minimum 
account size is less than $500,000, and (6) a binary variable that captures whether an 
advisory firm manages retail SMA portfolios within a broker-dealer program. We use 
these variables in an attempt to capture an advisory firm’s transparency in the market 
place as well as the level of investor monitoring of their funds. Industry experts suggest 
that greater market visibility is correlated to a greater influx of new capital. As a result, 
we test whether an advisory firm’s ability or decision to acquire more accounts is related 
to an inability to customize its SMAs, therefore leading to less of a performance 
difference between its concurrently-managed SMAs and MFs. Table 4 shows the simple 
correlation coefficients for the variables that are proxies for reputation.  The low 
correlations among the variables indicate that the variables are capturing different aspects 
of firm reputation. 
Table 5 reports the descriptive statistics for the concurrently-managed SMAs and 
MFs accounts. We regress the differences in abnormal performance on the differences in 
net inflows, differences in assets under management, differences in asset growth, and the 
reputation variables (Table 6).  
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For both large-cap and small cap accounts, we find a positive and significant (at a 
1% level) relationship between the difference in SMA and MF assets under management 
and the difference in SMA and MF abnormal performance. Therefore, the greater the 
disparity in an advisory firm’s SMA-MF assets under management, the greater the 
division in how the two product types are managed.  
The difference in net inflow is negative and significant (at a 5% level) for both 
large and small cap accounts. We expect that a greater difference in net inflow would 
instead be positively related to a difference in SMA and MF abnormal returns – as more 
reputable firms experience greater investor monitoring, and thus are less capable of 
individually customizing SMA portfolios. 
 The regression models in Table 6 neither support nor contradict the argument that 
an advisory firm’s ability to customize an SMA portfolio is constrained by its growth in 
assets or number of accounts. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
This paper tests for the existence of performance discrepancies among concurrently-
managed, domestic equity separately managed accounts (SMAs) and open-ended mutual 
funds (MFs).  By comparing SMA and MF performance, our results indicate that, net of 
all management and trading costs, raw and risk-adjusted small-cap SMA returns 
outperform MF returns from 1998 to 2003. In addition, our results suggest that 
differences in SMA and MF portfolio characteristics exist.  On average, SMAs hold 
fewer positions, experience less portfolio turnover, and encounter stronger net inflows of 
capital. 
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We find evidence that differences in abnormal performance within concurrently-
managed SMAs and MFs can be attributed to an advisor’s ability to customize individual 
SMA portfolios. Advisory firms that experience greater SMA asset growth experience 
larger discrepancies in SMA and MF performance. We suggest that a higher level of 
SMA accounts under management discourages an advisory firm from tailoring individual 
portfolios to investor objectives. However, our results do not support the hypothesis that 
smaller account sizes are a prohibiting factor in customizing and differentiating SMA 
portfolios (relative to MF portfolios). We find no significant difference in SMA/MF 
performance within an advisory firm that focuses on larger, institutional ($500,000 and 
above minimum account size) portfolios. 
In conclusion, when comparing average SMA and MF returns, our results suggest 
that investors place a greater percentage of new capital in SMAs and can achieve higher 
abnormal returns with particular classes of SMA portfolios. 
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 Table 1:  Summary Statistics – Concurrently-Managed SMAs and MFs 
Summary statistics of domestic equity, concurrently-managed retail and institutional separately managed accounts and 
mutual funds. Panel A includes descriptive statistics of the full sample. Panel B and Panel C represent samples of large-
cap and small-cap accounts. Differences in SMA and MF performance, turnover, and product assets under 
management, are from the Mobius MSEARCH database and the CRSP mutual fund database. Product asset under 
management (AUM) and net inflows are 6-year annual averages, while annual turnover and number of positions are for 
2003. Quarterly returns are net of any fees associated with fund management, fund administration, and trading 
commissions. FFC Alphas represent intercepts from regressing a fund’s excess returns on factor-mimicking portfolio 
returns adjusted for the excess return of the CRSP value-weighted market index, market-capitalization, book-to-market, 
and momentum obtained from Ken French and Mark Carhart. T-Statistics are the results from significance tests (means 
different from zero). Standard deviations are in parenthesis. 
* Significance at a 10% level. 
** Significance at a 5% level. 
*** Significance at a 1% level. 
 
Panel A: All SMAs and MFs 
   
All (n=115): Mean  Median t-Statistics 
Quarterly Return Difference (%) 0.166 0.100 1.71* 
 (5.122)   
 
FFC Alpha Difference (%) 0.758 0.900 0.83 
 (0.975)   
 
Annual Portfolio Turnover Difference (%) -3.254 3.500 -1.17 
 (29.698)   
 
Number of Stocks in Portfolio Difference -13.292 -5.000 -3.93*** 
(35.997)   
 
Average Cash Position Difference (%) 0.423 0.855 1.32  
 (3.428)  
 
Product AUM a/o 2003 Difference ($billions) 1.797 0.514 4.29***  
 (4.474)  
 
Annual Net Inflow Difference (%) 2.602 -0.523 0.15 
 (169.23)   
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 Table 1 (contd.):   
 
Panel B: Large and Small-Cap SMAs and MFs 
 
  
Large-Cap (n=58): Mean  Median t-Statistics 
Quarterly Return Difference (%) 0.056  0.004 0.33 
 (6.320)  
 
FFC Alpha Difference (%) -0.084  -0.033 -0.55 
 (1.148)   
 
Annual Portfolio Turnover Difference (%) -9.724  -2.500 -2.46** 
 (30.026)  
 
Number of Stocks in Portfolio Difference -12.810  -3.500 -2.14** 
 (45.536)  
 
Average Cash Position Difference (%) 0.475  0.595 1.12  
 (3.235)  
 
Product AUM a/o 2003 Difference ($billions) 2.828  0.840 3.52***  
 (6.056) 
 
Annual Net Inflow Difference (%) -15.628  -3.395 -2.07** 
 (50.53) 
 
 
  
Small-Cap (n=57): Mean   Median t-Statistics 
Quarterly Return Difference (%) 0.278  0.122 2.94*** 
 (3.488)  
 
FFC Alpha Difference (%) 0.238 0.200 2.44** 
 (0.735)  
 
Annual Portfolio Turnover Difference (%) 3.446  6.000 0.92 
 (28.068) 
 
Number of Stocks in Portfolio Difference -13.800  -7.000 -4.58** 
 (22.323) 
 
Average Cash Position Difference (%) 0.371  0.9666 0.76  
 (3.643) 
 
Product AUM a/o 2003 Difference ($billions) 0.766  0.377 4.65***  
 (1.244)  
 
Annual Net Inflow Difference (%) 19.345  -0.062 0.59 
 (229.242)  
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 Table 2: Itemized Comparisons of Raw and Risk-Adjusted Performance for Concurrently-
Managed Retail and Institutional Class SMAs and MFs (1998-2003) 
The following table presents four-factor regression results for each firm that concurrently manages a SMA and MF. 
Panel A includes comparisons of large-cap SMAs and MFs, while Panel B represents comparisons of small-cap SMAs 
and MFs T-Stat is the result from significance tests (different from zero) on the difference between the abnormal 
performance of the SMA and MF products. Abnormal performance is defined as the gross return on an SMA of MF 
less the return of a risk-free rate over the same time. The last three columns present regression results for the four-
factor Fama/French/Carhart model – where the dependent variable is quarterly difference in SMA and MF net returns. 
Alpha is the abnormal performance after adjusting for the four factors (RMRF, SMB, HML, and PR1YR). T-Statistics 
are in parenthesis and represent the results from significance tests (means different from zero). 
* Significance at a 10% level. 
** Significance at a 5% level. 
*** Significance at a 1% level. 
 
itititititititititiit YRPRBHMLBSMBBRMRFBERETURN εα +++++= 1  
 
Panel A: Large-Cap 
 
 Difference 
Firm Alpha RMRF SMB HML PR1YR
1 0.001 
(0.08) 
0.160 
(1.550) 
0.290** 
(2.470) 
0.590*** 
(4.760) 
0.190 
(1.590) 
2 -0.002 
(-0.150) 
0.040 
(0.360) 
-0.150 
(-1.090) 
-0.280* 
(-2.040) 
0.480*** 
(3.700) 
3 0.006 
(0.700) 
0.040 
(0.400) 
-0.070 
(-0.600) 
-0.610*** 
(-4.820) 
-0.060 
(-0.540) 
4 -0.008 
(-0.550) 
-0.110 
(-0.670) 
0.100 
(0.530) 
0.620*** 
(2.960) 
0.710*** 
(3.680) 
5 -0.011 
(-0.900) 
0.230 
(1.700) 
0.290* 
(1.870) 
0.550*** 
(3.320) 
0.320* 
(2.060) 
6 0.006 
(0.450) 
-0.180 
(-1.220) 
-0.440** 
(-2.490) 
-0.030 
(-0.170) 
-0.310* 
(-1.810) 
7 -0.008 
(-0.910) 
-0.070 
(-0.650) 
0.060 
(0.490) 
0.230** 
(1.830) 
0.210** 
(1.840) 
8 -0.028 
(-1.690) 
-0.020 
(-0.130) 
-0.120 
(-0.560) 
-0.510** 
(2.250) 
0.250 
(1.160) 
9 0.014 
(1.310) 
0.070 
(0.620) 
-0.470*** 
(-3.410) 
-0.290* 
(-2.040) 
-0.240* 
(-1.770) 
10 -0.005 
(-0.270) 
0.060 
(0.300) 
-0.160 
(-0.730) 
0.850*** 
(3.590) 
-0.180 
(-0.810) 
11 0.002 
(0.190) 
-0.040 
(-0.360) 
-0.050 
(-0.410) 
0.190 
(1.540) 
-0.003 
(-0.020) 
12 -0.009 
(-0.840) 
0.240* 
(1.980) 
0.150 
(1.100) 
-0.360** 
(-2.470) 
0.210 
(1.530) 
13 -0.018** 
(-2.670) 
0.210** 
(2.760) 
0.230** 
(2.600) 
0.070 
(0.740) 
0.160* 
(1.850) 
14 -0.004 
(-0.290) 
-0.520*** 
(-3.190) 
-0.550*** 
(-2.900) 
0.590*** 
(2.980) 
0.210 
(1.160) 
15  0.000 
(0.030) 
0.010 
(0.070) 
-0.130 
(-0.700) 
-0.960*** 
(-5.040) 
-0.450** 
(-2.510) 
16 -0.005 
(-0.510) 
0.090 
(0.730) 
0.170 
(1.260) 
0.030 
(0.180) 
0.430*** 
(3.260) 
17 -0.014 
(-1.190) 
0.110 
(0.820) 
0.180 
(1.190) 
0.560*** 
(3.460) 
0.290* 
(1.920) 
18 0.016 
(1.260) 
-0.130 
(-0.860) 
-0.090 
(-0.490) 
-0.440** 
(-2.430) 
-0.440** 
(-2.590) 
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 Table 2 (contd.) 
19 0.008 
(0.520) 
0.005 
(0.030) 
0.110 
(0.530) 
-1.290*** 
(-5.990) 
-0.450** 
(-2.230) 
20 0.012 
(1.690) 
-0.005 
(-0.060) 
0.150 
(1.520) 
-0.010 
(-0.100) 
0.020 
(0.170) 
21 -0.023 
(-1.590) 
-0.050 
(-0.330) 
0.040 
(0.200) 
0.610*** 
(3.040) 
0.410** 
(2.220) 
22 -0.001 
(-0.070) 
0.160 
(1.460) 
0.240* 
(1.940) 
0.780*** 
(6.030) 
-0.100 
(-0.830) 
23 0.025* 
(2.060) 
-0.380** 
(-2.660) 
-0.090 
(-0.560) 
-0.450** 
(-2.620) 
-0.280* 
(-1.730) 
24 -0.006 
(-0.520) 
-0.120 
(-0.970) 
-0.060 
(-0.410) 
-0.370** 
(-2.490) 
0.020 
(0.150) 
25 -0.009 
(-0.870) 
0.060 
(0.480) 
-0.020 
(-0.160) 
0.310** 
(2.170) 
0.070 
(0.550) 
26 0.021 
(1.160) 
0.380* 
(1.910) 
-0.390 
(1.660) 
-0.140 
(-0.590) 
-0.260 
(-1.120) 
27 0.009 
(0.870) 
0.020 
(0.160) 
-0.090 
(-0.680) 
0.280* 
(2.090) 
0.040 
(0.350) 
28 0.014 
(0.850) 
0.270 
(1.450) 
0.310 
(1.430) 
-0.770*** 
(-3.390) 
-0.010 
(-0.060) 
29 -0.004 
(-0.530) 
0.100 
(1.270) 
-0.110 
(-1.170) 
0.090 
(0.890) 
0.010 
(0.150) 
30 0.005 
(0.350) 
-0.030 
(-0.190) 
-0.070 
(-0.350) 
-1.060*** 
(-5.400) 
-0.320* 
(-1.740) 
31 -0.003 
(-0.420) 
-0.060 
(-0.690) 
0.040 
(0.400) 
0.260** 
(2.490) 
0.040 
(0.450) 
32 -0.001 
(-0.040) 
0.440** 
(2.740) 
0.210 
(1.140) 
-0.240 
(-1.240) 
-0.060 
(-0.320) 
33 0.013 
(1.120) 
-0.160 
(-1.180) 
0.030 
(0.190) 
0.050 
(0.310) 
-0.300* 
(-2.030) 
34 -0.006 
(-0.620) 
-0.070 
(-0.680) 
-0.140 
(-1.210) 
0.080 
(0.640) 
0.090 
(0.780) 
35 0.002 
(0.140) 
 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.110 
(0.690) 
-0.030 
(-0.200) 
-0.100 
(-0.620) 
36 -0.018 
(-1.730) 
0.360*** 
(3.130) 
-0.170 
(-1.300) 
0.700*** 
(5.010) 
0.310** 
(2.340) 
37 -0.002 
(-0.180) 
-0.090 
(-0.830) 
0.030 
(0.210) 
0.360** 
(2.670) 
0.170 
(1.380) 
38 0.035*** 
(3.320) 
0.150 
(1.210) 
0.090 
(0.610) 
-0.460*** 
(-3.140) 
-0.310** 
(-2.310) 
39 0.001 
(0.060) 
0.007 
(0.050) 
0.490*** 
(2.940) 
-0.140 
(-0.780) 
0.130 
(0.770) 
40 -0.008 
(-0.490) 
-0.110 
(-0.560) 
0.006 
(0.030) 
0.680*** 
(2.910) 
0.260 
(1.200) 
41 -0.016 
(-1.450) 
-0.020 
(-0.150) 
-0.030 
(-0.230) 
0.470*** 
(3.060) 
0.170 
(1.200) 
42 -0.001 
(-0.130) 
0.060 
(0.710) 
-0.210* 
(-2.070) 
-0.420*** 
(-3.850) 
-0.070 
(-0.650) 
43 -0.026* 
(-2.080) 
-0.030 
(-0.230) 
0.460** 
(2.730) 
0.370** 
(2.110) 
0.290* 
(1.770) 
44 -0.011** 
(-2.270) 
0.013 
(0.230) 
0.025 
(0.370) 
0.006 
(0.090) 
0.040 
(0.600) 
45 -0.007 
(-1.130) 
0.470*** 
(7.150) 
0.006 
(0.740) 
0.150* 
(1.860) 
0.030 
(0.400) 
46 -0.006 
(-0.700) 
0.096 
1.030 
-0.038 
-0.360 
0.085 
0.750 
0.045 
0.430 
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 Table 2 (contd.) 
47 0.002 
(0.660) 
0.052 
1.400 
-0.020 
-0.460 
-0.007 
-0.150 
0.019 
0.450 
48  0.000  
(0.040) 
0.055 
1.560 
0.039 
0.950 
-0.039 
-0.910 
0.045 
1.120 
49 0.001 
(0.090) 
0.017 
0.200 
-0.300** 
-3.010 
-0.150 
-1.400 
0.031 
0.320 
50 0.008 
(0.780) 
0.022 
0.180 
0.044 
0.320 
-0.011 
-0.770 
-0.012 
-0.090 
51 -0.001 
(-0.330) 
0.045 
2.260 
0.019** 
0.830 
0.030 
1.240 
0.041* 
1.810 
52  0.000  
(0.050) 
0.021 
1.330 
0.012 
0.650 
0.009 
0.470 
0.020 
1.160 
53   0.000 
(0.210) 
0.013 
0.720 
0.029 
1.390 
0.008 
0.350 
0.033 
1.650 
54   0.000  
(-0.110) 
0.016 
0.980 
0.026 
1.410 
0.003 
0.160 
0.027 
1.470 
55 0.001 
(0.770) 
-0.006 
-0.270 
-0.006 
-0.250 
-0.010 
-0.390 
-0.001 
-0.030 
56  0.000  
(0.200) 
0.011 
0.770 
0.006 
0.360 
0.018 
1.040 
0.002 
0.120 
57 0.002 
(1.500) 
0.035* 
1.890 
0.001 
0.030 
0.029 
1.310 
0.007 
0.310 
58 0.006 
(1.380) 
0.046 
0.900 
-0.063 
-1.080 
-0.016 
-0.270 
0.031 
0.540 
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 Table 2 (contd.) 
Panel B: Small-Cap 
 
 Difference 
Fund Alpha RMRF SMB HML PR1YR
1 0.008 
(1.410) 
-0.110* 
(-1.770) 
0.070 
(1.000) 
-0.050 
(-0.680) 
-0.060 
(-0.880) 
2 -0.004 
(-0.800) 
0.020 
(0.500) 
0.060 
(0.950) 
0.010 
(0.220) 
0.070 
(1.230) 
3     0 
(0.150) 
-0.005 
(-0.230) 
0.060** 
(2.290) 
0.010 
(0.520) 
0.009 
(0.360) 
4 0.008** 
(2.690) 
0.000 
(0.00) 
-0.030 
(-0.770) 
-0.030 
(-0.630) 
-0.020 
(-0.460) 
5 -0.002 
(-0.300) 
0.120* 
(2.070) 
0.080 
(1.200) 
-0.180** 
(-2.600) 
0.030 
(0.490) 
6 0.008* 
(1.760) 
-0.006 
(-0.130) 
-0.180*** 
(-3.070) 
-0.110 
(-1.730) 
-0.110* 
(-1.860) 
7 0.002 
(0.790) 
-0.007 
(-0.270) 
0.030 
(1.140) 
 0.000 
(0.010) 
-0.010 
(-0.440) 
8 0.002** 
(2.210) 
0.018 
(1.470) 
0.013 
(0.920) 
-0.001 
(-0.040) 
0.002 
(0.140) 
9 0.032* 
(1.990) 
-0.234 
(-1.290) 
-0.310 
(-1.480) 
-0.320 
(-1.450) 
-0.310 
(-1.490) 
10 0.001 
(0.430) 
-0.001 
(-0.030) 
0.040 
(0.800) 
-0.060 
(-1.200) 
-0.100** 
(-2.280) 
11 -0.010 
(-0.790) 
0.630*** 
(4.580) 
0.020 
(0.130) 
0.290* 
(1.750) 
0.170 
(1.080) 
12 0.012 
(1.200) 
0.050 
(0.420) 
-0.310** 
(-2.400) 
-0.084 
(-0.620) 
-0.120 
(-0.960) 
13 0.001 
(1.240) 
0.011 
(0.940) 
-0.006 
(-0.390) 
   0.000  
(-0.020) 
-0.001 
(-0.080) 
14 0.005** 
(2.580) 
0.020 
(0.950) 
0.060** 
(2.140) 
-0.030 
(-0.940) 
-0.010 
(-0.470) 
15    0.000  
(-0.090) 
0.030 
(0.660) 
0.100** 
(2.110) 
-0.020 
(-0.410) 
-0.040 
(-0.810) 
16 0.007* 
(1.750) 
-0.011 
(-0.230) 
0.080 
(1.510) 
-0.020 
(-0.420) 
-0.010 
(-0.220) 
17 0.003 
(1.050) 
-0.010 
(-0.330) 
0.040 
(1.020) 
-0.006 
(-0.170) 
0.008 
(0.220) 
18 0.003 
(0.740) 
-0.010 
(-0.310) 
0.120** 
(2.150) 
-0.060 
(-0.940) 
-0.060 
(-1.010) 
19 0.022 
(1.490) 
0.005 
(0.030) 
-0.160 
(-0.850) 
0.910*** 
(4.460) 
0.360* 
(1.900) 
20 0.002 
(0.270) 
0.003 
(0.040) 
-0.008 
(-0.080) 
0.050 
(0.550) 
0.030 
(0.380) 
21 0.003** 
(2.110) 
0.010 
(0.730) 
0.030 
(1.390) 
-0.014 
(-0.650) 
-0.007 
(-0.370) 
22 0.001 
(0.490) 
0.030 
(1.150) 
0.030 
(1.330) 
0.000  
(-0.010) 
0.020 
(0.700) 
23 0.001 
(1.390) 
0.013 
(1.090) 
0.000  
(-0.010) 
0.010* 
(0.760) 
0.006 
(0.460) 
24 0.000  
(-0.090) 
-0.043 
(-1.050) 
-0.013 
(-0.280) 
-0.070 
(-1.510) 
0.046 
(1.010) 
25 -0.020 
(-1.440) 
0.020 
(0.120) 
0.230 
(1.260) 
-0.890*** 
(-4.630) 
-0.350* 
(-1.970) 
26 0.003 
(0.630) 
0.046 
(0.940) 
0.065 
(1.140) 
-0.020 
(-0.420) 
0.030 
(0.540) 
27 0.003 
(0.270) 
0.081 
(0.670) 
0.160 
(1.120) 
-0.110 
(-0.780) 
0.190 
(1.370) 
28 0.004*** 
(3.920) 
 0.000  
(-0.040) 
-0.004 
(-0.340) 
-0.009 
(-0.730) 
-0.020* 
(-2.050) 
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29 0.002 
(1.220) 
0.019 
(1.130) 
0.001 
(0.030) 
0.005 
(0.250) 
-0.009 
(-0.470) 
30 0.001 
(0.280) 
0.055** 
(2.570) 
0.014 
(0.570) 
0.037 
(1.410) 
0.005 
(0.200) 
31 0.001 
(0.080) 
-0.056 
(-0.350) 
0.153 
(0.820) 
-0.070 
(-0.370) 
0.051 
(0.280) 
32 0.000 
(-0.140) 
0.053 
(1.410) 
0.033 
(0.770) 
-0.002 
(-0.040) 
0.074* 
(1.770) 
33 0.003** 
(2.100) 
0.008 
(0.410) 
0.018 
(0.820) 
0.010 
(0.390) 
-0.008 
(-0.390) 
34 0.002 
(0.390) 
0.013 
(0.260) 
0.102 
(1.680) 
0.016 
(0.240) 
0.082 
(1.380) 
35 -0.001 
(-0.630) 
0.028 
(1.550) 
0.037* 
(1.820) 
-0.003 
(-0.140) 
0.034 
(1.680) 
36 0.008* 
(2.060) 
-0.035 
(-0.800) 
0.016 
(0.320) 
-0.149** 
(-2.790) 
-0.072 
(-1.450) 
37 0.004*** 
(3.800) 
0.0016 
(0.140) 
0.005 
(0.380) 
-0.005 
(-0.390) 
-0.010 
(-0.820) 
38 0.001 
(0.320) 
0.013 
(0.280) 
0.054 
(1.030) 
-0.009 
(-0.170) 
0.024 
(0.470) 
39 0.019*** 
(3.750) 
-0.068 
(-1.160) 
-0.089 
(-1.320) 
-0.148** 
(-2.100) 
-0.120* 
(-1.830) 
40 -0.001 
(-0.170) 
0.041 
(0.710) 
0.0998 
(1.500) 
0.007 
(0.090) 
0.111 
(1.700) 
41 -0.001 
(-0.330) 
0.113** 
(2.710) 
0.060 
(1.250) 
0.012 
(0.240) 
0.082* 
(1.730) 
42 -0.001 
(-0.120) 
0.0195 
(0.170) 
0.360 
(0.280) 
-0.135 
(-1.000) 
0.167 
(1.330) 
43 -0.002 
(-0.310) 
-0.015 
(-0.290) 
0.060 
(0.940) 
-0.050 
(-0.790) 
-0.330 
(-0.560) 
44 -0.009 
(-0.340) 
0.340 
(1.060) 
-0.770** 
(-2.110) 
-0.300 
(-0.790) 
-0.008 
(-0.020) 
45 0.002 
(0.240) 
0.110 
(0.960) 
-0.020 
(-0.160) 
-0.030 
(-0.220) 
-0.060 
(-0.470) 
46 -0.001 
(-0.220) 
-0.056 
(-1.170) 
-0.070 
(-1.260) 
-0.053 
(-0.920) 
-0.110* 
(-20.900) 
47 0.002 
(0.420) 
-0.008 
(-0.180) 
0.080 
(1.480) 
-0.140** 
(-2.590) 
-0.056 
(-1.070) 
48 0.003 
(0.460) 
0.124* 
(1.750) 
0.120 
(1.470) 
-0.110 
(-1.320) 
0.110 
(1.390) 
49 0.003 
(1.320) 
0.008 
(0.280) 
0.010 
(0.310) 
-0.030 
(-0.880) 
-0.023 
(-0.730) 
50 0.008** 
(2.410) 
0.030 
(0.780) 
0.020 
(0.370) 
-0.060 
(-1.360) 
-0.030 
(-0.660) 
51 0.003 
(0.530) 
0.034 
(0.560) 
0.110 
(1.560) 
-0.010 
(-0.130) 
0.080 
(1.220) 
52 0.003 
(0.630) 
0.050 
(0.940) 
0.065 
(1.140) 
-0.025 
(-0.420) 
0.030 
(0.540) 
53 0.001 
(0.600) 
-0.010 
(-0.880) 
0.060*** 
(3.090) 
-0.030 
(-1.510) 
-0.030* 
(-1.860) 
54 0.003 
(0.650) 
0.070 
(1.320) 
0.133** 
(2.110) 
-0.060 
(-0.840) 
0.080 
(1.370) 
55 -0.013 
(-1.110) 
-0.020 
(-0.180) 
0.070 
(0.450) 
-0.140 
(-0.820) 
-0.060 
(-0.410) 
56 0.002 
(0.960) 
0.016 
(0.890) 
0.028 
(1.300) 
-0.010 
(-0.430) 
0.008 
(0.390) 
57 -0.001 
(-0.210) 
0.147* 
(2.060) 
0.164* 
(1.980) 
0.058 
(0.670) 
0.980 
(1.220) 
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 Table 3: SMA WRAP Fees 
The following table presents ranges of WRAP fees for five broker-dealers that offer sub-advisory arrangements for SMA firms, segmented by minimum account size. WRAP fees 
are all-inclusive, and therefore include all costs related to and account’s management, custodial services, and trading commissions. For each minimum account size, the average, 
minimum, and maximum WRAP fees are equally weighted averages across the five broker-dealers. 
 
 
                                       Account Minimums   
Firm  
$100,000-
$500,000
$500,000- 
$1,000,000
$1,000,000-
$2,000,000
$2,000,000-
$5,000,000 $5,000,000+
1 Minimum 0.021 0.015 0.013 0.012 0.009 
 Mid Point 0.026 0.0185 0.016 0.0145 0.009 
 Maximum 0.030 0.022 0.019 0.017 0.010 
2 Minimum 0.018 0.016 0.012 0.012 0.008 
 Mid Point 0.023 0.021 0.017 0.017 0.011 
 Maximum 0.028 0.025 0.021 0.021 0.014 
3 Minimum 0.020 0.013 0.011 0.009 0.009 
 Mid Point 0.025 0.018 0.015 0.013 0.013 
 Maximum 0.030 0.022 0.019 0.017 0.017 
4 Minimum 0.020 0.016 0.013 0.010 0.008 
 Mid Point 0.024 0.019 0.016 0.013 0.011 
 Maximum 0.027 0.023 0.019 0.016 0.013 
5 Minimum 0.019 0.014 0.013 0.011 0.008 
 Mid Point 0.024 0.018 0.017 0.015 0.011 
 Maximum 0.028 0.021 0.021 0.018 0.013 
       
Avg. Mid Point 
 
 0.024 0.019 0.016 0.014 0.011 
Avg. Minimum  0.020 0.015 0.012 0.011 0.008 
Avg. Maximum 
 
 0.029 0.023 0.020 0.018 0.013 
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 Table 4: Correlations of Firm Reputation Variables 
 
Panel A: All Managers 
   ACCTGROWTH  EFGROWTH  MORNINGSTAR AGE    MINIMUM SUBADV   
ACCTGROWTH   1.000  0.316   0.127  -0.178     -0.215  -0.492 
EFGROWTH     1.000   0.221  -0.216           0.082  -0.062 
MORNINGSTAR       1.000  - 0.253     -0.226  -0.315 
AGE             1.000        0.054   0.154 
MINIMUM                  1.000   0.458 
SUBADV                1.000 
 
Panel B: Large-Cap Managers 
   ACCTGROWTH  EFGROWTH  MORNINGSTAR AGE    MINIMUM SUBADV   
ACCTGROWTH   1.000  -0.005    0.016  -0.064     -0.346  -0.538 
EFGROWTH      1.000   -0.018  -0.061            0.147   0.064 
MORNINGSTAR        1.000  -0.237      -0.159  -0.169 
AGE            1.000      -0.096  -0.038 
MINIMUM                  1.000   0.408 
SUBADV               1.000 
 
 
Panel C: Small-Cap Managers 
   ACCTGROWTH  EFGROWTH  MORNINGSTAR AGE    MINIMUM SUBADV   
ACCTGROWTH   1.000  0.474   0.256  -0.286       -0.020  -0.451 
EFGROWTH     1.000   0.380  -0.307           0.131  -0.102 
MORNINGSTAR       1.000  -0.280     -0.311  -0.445 
AGE             1.000       0.198   0.348 
MINIMUM                 1.000   0.503 
SUBADV               1.000 
 
ACCTGROWTH: Average percentage growth in size for all separately-managed accounts from 1998 to 2003. 
EFGROWTH: Average percentage growth in size for separately-managed Endowments and Foundations accounts from 1998 to 2003. 
MORNINGSTAR: Average 5-year Morningstar rating for all mutual funds managed by investment firm. 
AGE: Number of years investment management firm has been in existence. 
MINIMUM: Binary variable representing whether an advisory firm’s SMA minimum account size is in excess of $500,000, zero otherwise. 
SUBADV: Binary variable representing whether an advisory firm participates in an SMA WRAP program sponsored by a broker-dealer, zero otherwise. 
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 Table 5:  Descriptive Statistics 
This table provides descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables used is the proceeding models (Table 6). D.Alpha is the average annual difference in four-factor 
alphas from concurrently-managed SMAs and MFs. D.NetInflow is the average annual difference in net inflows between concurrently-managed SMA’s and MF’s. 
D.LNAUM is the average annual difference in SMA and MF assets under management. D.AUMGROWTH is the annual average difference in percentage growth in SMA 
and MF assets under management.  ACCTGROWTH is the annual average percentage growth in size for all SMAs managed by an investment management firm. 
EFGROWTH is the average annual percentage growth in size for all SMAs managed by an investment management firm that are categorized as either an “Endowment” 
or “Foundation”.  MORNINGSTAR is the average 5-year Morningstar rating for all mutual funds managed by an investment management firm. AGE is the total number 
of years an investment management firm has been in existence (as of 2003). SMA data regarding performance, product assets under management, and minimum 
purchase data is from the Mobius MSEARCH database. MF data regarding product assets under management and performance is from the CRSP mutual fund database.  
Four-factor alphas are based on quarterly returns (1998-2003) that are net of any fees associated with fund management, fund administration, and trading commissions.  
 
All (n=115) 
 
 D.ALPHA D.NETINFLOW D.LNAUM D.AUMGROWTH ACCTGROWTH EFACCTGROWTH 
MORNINGST
AR AGE 
Mean 0.001 
(0.010) 
-0.128 
(0.748) 
1.393 
(1.471) 
0.142 
(2.008) 
0.050 
(0.155) 
0.229 
(0.529) 
3.255 
(0.768) 
36.736 
(33.845) 
Median 0.001 
 
-0.011 1.203 0.013 0.025 0.069 3.087 26.250 
 
Large Cap (n=58) 
 
 D.ALPHA D.NETINFLOW D.LNAUM D.AUMGROWTH ACCTGROWTH EFACCTGROWTH MORNINGSTAR AGE 
Mean -0.001 
(0.011) 
-0.155 
(0.491) 
1.523 
(1.562) 
-0.080 
(0.443) 
0.026 
(0.166) 
0.157 
(0.488) 
3.295 
(0.799) 
41.272 
(37.888) 
Median 1.1E-4 
 
-0.041 1.213 0.001 0.010 -0.027 3.000 27.125 
 
Small Cap (n=57) 
 
 D.ALPHA D.NETINFLOW D.LNAUM D.AUMGROWTH ACCTGROWTH EFACCTGROWTH MORNINGSTAR AGE 
Mean 0.002 
(0.007) 
-0.102 
(0.935) 
1.268 
(1.382) 
0.355 
(2.776) 
0.075 
(0.141) 
0.293 
(0.560) 
3.213 
(0.740) 
32.120 
(28.770) 
Median 0.002 
 
-0.005 1.087 0.022 0.060 0.102 3.100 22.000 
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 Table 6: Multivariate Results 
This table provides OLS regression results. The dependent variable is the average annual difference in four-factor alphas from concurrently-managed SMAs and MFs. 
D.NETINFLOW is the average annual difference in net inflows between concurrently-managed SMA’s and MF’s. D.LNAUM is the average annual difference in SMA and MF 
assets under management. D.AUMGROWTH is the annual average difference in percentage growth in SMA and MF assets under management from 1998 to 2003.  
ACCTGROWTH is the annual average percentage growth in size for all SMAs managed by an investment management firm. EFGROWTH is the average annual percentage growth 
in size for all SMAs managed by an investment management firm that are categorized as either an “Endowment” or “Foundation”.  MORNINGSTAR is the average 5-year 
Morningstar rating for all mutual funds managed by an investment management firm. AGE is the total number of years an investment management firm has been in existence (as of 
2003). MINIMUM is a binary variable that captures whether an advisory firm’s SMA minimum account size us less than $500,000, zero otherwise. SUBADV is a binary variable 
that captures whether an advisory firm manages retail SMA portfolios within a broker-dealer program, zero otherwise. SMA data regarding performance, product assets under 
management, and minimum purchase data is from the Mobius MSEARCH database. MF data regarding product assets under management and performance is from the CRSP 
mutual fund database.  Four-factor alphas are based on quarterly returns (1998-2003) that are net of any fees associated with fund management, fund administration, and trading 
commissions. T-statistics are in parenthesis and are results from significance tests (coefficients different from zero). 
* Significance at a 10% level; ** Significance at a 5% level; *** Significance at a 1% level. 
 
Variable Total Large-Cap  Small-Cap 
INTERCEPT 
 
-0.004 
(-0.51) 
-0.013 
(-1.04) 
0.005 
(0.70) 
D.NETINFLOW 
 
-0.013*** 
(-3.33) 
-0.014** 
(-2.45) 
-0.021** 
(-2.42) 
D.LNAUM 
 
-0.001 
(-0.37) 
-0.001 
(-0.52) 
0.001  
(0.87) 
D.AUMGROWTH 
 
0.012*** 
(3.39) 
0.018** 
(2.10) 
0.018** 
(2.55) 
ACCTGROWTH  
 
0.001 
(0.03) 
-0.009 
(-0.42) 
-0.008** 
(-0.68) 
EFGROWTH 
 
-0.001 
(-0.28) 
-0.009 
(-1.28) 
0.003 
(1.06) 
MORNINGSTAR  
 
0.001 
(0.39) 
0.003 
(1.17) 
-0.002 
(-0.95) 
AGE 
 
2E-4 
(0.87) 
2E-4 
(0.32) 
9E-4** 
(2.53) 
MINIMUM -0.004 
(-1.50) 
-0.006 
(-1.08) 
-0.001 
(-0.29) 
SUBADV 0.003 
(0.76) 
0.004 
(0.59) 
-0.004 
(-1.41) 
 
 
Number of Observations  115   58   57 
Adjusted R-Square 0.113 0.190 0.096 
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